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KarlA. BoedeckerandFredW. Morgan
Marketersof used productsface uncertaintyin the legal environmentbecause of the
inconsistentways their offerings are treated with respect to strict product liability. The
authors analyze the conceptual underpinningsof strict liability to assess its applicability to
used goods. Then they examine litigated cases to present an overview of currentjudicial
treatmentof defective usedproducts. Finally, they discuss policy issues related to used products in the context of both the law and marketing.

doctrineof strictproductliabilityfor sellersof
cennewgoodsdevelopedduringthemid-twentieth
debate
in
out
of
academic
tury largepart
vigorous
anddiscussion[Priest1985].WilliamProsser[1960]championedthe strictproductliabilitydoctrinein his seminalarticle, "AssaultUpontheCitadel."He subsequently
synthesizedthe academicdialoguewiththerelevantjudicialopinions as Reporterfor the Restatement(Second)of Torts
[1965].1By then,Californiahadopenlyembracedstrictliability for personalinjuryrecoveriesin defectiveproduct
cases [Greenman
v. YubaPowerProducts1963].Otherjurisdictionssoonfollowed,andProsser[1966]eventuallyproclaimedthatthe "citadelhadfallen."
strictliabilityhave cenSubsequentissues surrounding
teredon the extentto whichthe doctrineshouldapply.For
of servicesbe subjectedto strict
example,shouldmarketers
couna
to theirproduct-oriented
in
manner
similar
liability
franShould
1987]?
nonmanufacturing
terparts[Morgan
forthe defective
chisorsbe heldto a strictliabilitystandard
outputof theirfranchisees[Hadfield1990]?A relatedquestionconcernssellersof usedgoods-should theybe strictly
liablefor injuriescausedby the productstheysell buthave
typicallynot manufactured?
hereby consideringthe theThisquestionis approached
as originallyconceivedby
of
strict
liability
ory
product
tortsscholarsandlaterembodiedin section402Aof theRestatement[1965]. A brief examinationof some leading
casesillustrateshowjudgesreliedon thosetheoreticalconceptsto forgemodernproductliabilitylaw.Wethenreview
recentcase law involvingquestionsof strictsellerliability
forproduct-related
injuriesfromusedgoods.2Wealsoconecsiderto whatextentthesamecircumstances
(marketing,
onomic,andsocial)thatgave rise to strictproductliability
for new goodsarealso relevantfor usedgoods.
The

KARLA. BOEDECKER
is Professor of Business Administration,
McLarenCollege of Business, University of San Francisco.FRED
W. MORGAN
is Professorof Marketing,College of Business Administration,University of Oklahoma.

178

Developmentof the Conceptof Strict
ProductLiability
At the beginning of the twentiethcentury,rapidindustrialization and expandingmarketshad resultedin multilevel distributionsystems that placed intermediariesbetween manufacturersand final buyers. These distributionchannels, coupled with "privityof contract,"3effectively precludedrecoveries in productinjurycases. Unless a consumercould establish either an enforceablewarrantyon the partof the immediate supplieror negligence in designing, producing,or failing to inspect the defective item, he or she had to absorbthe
loss from the injury.
The New York Courtof Appeals began to erode the privity doctrine in personal injury actions in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Company [1916] by extending a manufacturer'sliability beyond its immediatepurchaser(most often
a wholesaleror retaildealer).Though some jurisdictionsfollowed MacPherson'slead, they initially did so only for manufacturersof "imminentlydangerous"products,which typically included food, drugs, and automobiles.Even in those
jurisdictionsadoptingMacPherson, the privity requirement
remainedfor injuriesfrom productsnot classified as "inherently dangerous," and for all such actions in otherjurisdictions. Furthermore,injuredconsumersoften had great difficulty proving negligence against manufacturersand others
within the distributionchain.
Tort scholars became disenchanted with negligence as
the sole basis for productinjuryclaims, arguingthatthe negligence doctrinealone would not meet all the emergingpublic policy objectives of tort law. In his 1941 treatise,Prosser [p. 1141] set forth what he regardedas "all of the valid
argumentssupportingstrict liability":
* Thepublicinterestin the utmostsafetyof products;
* Thedemandfor the maximumprotectionof the consumer;
* The assuranceto consumersthatis impliedby placingthe
goodson the marketfor humanuse;
* Theconsumer'sjustifiablerelianceon the apparentsafetyof
a productthathe orshefindson themarketbecausethedefendanthasputit there;
* Theconsumerbeingthe seller'sultimateobjective;and
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* Thedesirability
of action"andallowof avoiding"circuity
fromintermediaries.
inginsteaddirectrecovery
In his role as Reporterfor the Restatement(Second)of
Torts[1965],Prosserdistilledtheprevious30+ yearsof academicdebateandwhathe regardedas the leadingjudicial
opinionsaboutstrictproductliabilityinto402A. Nonetheless, injuredparties still faced formidableproblemsof
proof,only somewhatalleviatedby the ruleof res ipsa losuchas wholesalersrequitur,andreachingintermediaries
mainedtroublesome.
andintermediarSome courtsexpandedmanufacturers'
ies' liabilitiesthroughchangesin warrantylaw.Thoughhe
roundlycriticizedwarrantylaw as a meansfor achieving
strictliabilityto consumers,Prosser[1966,p. 791] haileda
warrantycase as "the fall of the citadelof privity"[Henningsenv. BloomfieldMotors1960]. Henningsenupheld
the validityof productinjuryclaimsbroughtby the spouse
of a new car purchaseragainstboththe manufacturer
and
thedealer.Pointingto "modemmarketing
conditions,"the
Henningsencourtfoundthatan impliedwarrantyof meri.e., thatgoodsarefit to use forthegeneralpurchantability,
for
which
pose
theyweredesigned,attachedto the carand
followedit throughthe distribution
systemto thebuyerand
membersof his household.Noneof the traditional
contract
disclaimerprovidefenses,particularly
privityandwarranty
or its dealerfromliability.
sions,insulatedthemanufacturer
In justifyingits decision,the courtstatedits intentto allocatelossescausedby injuriesfromdefectiveproductsto the
partiesbest able to controlthe risksandequitablyallocate
the costs [Henningsen
v. BloomfieldMotors1960].
JusticeRogerTraynor
of theCalifornia
SupremeCourtpioneeredopenjudicialacceptanceof the strictliabilitydoctrine,which had first appearedin reportedcases thatinvolved food and beverage products[Prosser 1960, pp.
1103-10]. As earlyas 1944, in a concurringopinionthat
noneof his fellowjusticesjoined,Traynorusedpublicpolto advocatethe adoptionof strictliabilityfor
icy arguments
defective products [Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
1944].Threeyearslaterhe unsuccessfullyurgedhis brethrento imposestrictliability"openlyandnotby spuriousapplicationof [res ipsa] rules" [Gordonv. Aztec Brewing
Co. 1947].
By 1963,however,Traynor's
position,set forthin Greenmanv. YubaPowerProducts[1963],becamelawin California. His opinion,whichdrewheavilyon academicarticles
andtreatises,essentiallymatchedthe synthesisthatProsser
haddevelopedandwouldsoon appearas 402A of theRestatement[1965].4This strictliabilitydoctrinehadbecome
law in 28 states by 1971; 40 had embracedit by 1976
[Rabin1990, p. 81]; and48 statespresentlyutilize some
form of strictliability in cases stemmingfrom productrelatedinjuries.5
As currentlyapplied,strictlyliabilityrefersto liability
withoutreferenceto thedefendant's
behavior;instead,it examinesthe natureof the allegedlydefectiveproduct.That
is, to recoupdamages,the plaintiffconsumermust show
thatthe defendantmarketer'sproductcausedthe injuryin
the injuredplaintiffmustprovethat
question.Furthermore,
theproductwasdefectivein somemanner(e.g.,unsafelydesigned,improperlymanufactured,
accompaniedby inade-
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quatewarnings)when the consumeracquiredit. In addition,productliabilitylaw variesfromstateto state;hence,
eachis free,forexample,to determinehow strictliabilityis
to be appliedwithinits boundaries.
thereis
Consequently,
no nationalstrictliabilitystandard,
thoughthe Restatement
[1965]is widelydisseminated.

Strict Product Liabilityin Used Goods
Transactions:Case Law
Neitherthe voluminousacademicliteraturenorthejudicial
opinionsthatresultedin strictliabilityas describedherediThe Restatement
rectlyaddressedused goodstransactions.
[1965,402A] does not employthe term"usedgoods" or
anythingsimilar,yet 402A leavesampleroomfor courts
to bringused goods withinits ambit.In general,however,
the role of strictliabilityfor sellersof used goods has not
foundwidespreadacceptancein the courtsduringthe 27
years since the publicationof the Restatement[1965,
402A]. Most states that have examinedstrict liability
claimsagainstsellersof usedproductshaveruledin favor
of the sellers.
In discussingused goods cases from variousjurisdictions,we haveorganizedthejudicialopinionsaccordingto
the principalrationaleutilizedto resolvethe dispute.These
in Exhibit1.
argumentsaresummarized

Seller Knowledge-Actual or Imputed
OccasionalSellerRationale
Subsections(1)(a)and(1)(b)utilizetheword"seller,"but
do not specificallyreferto new productsor explicitlyexclude used goods marketers.Comment(f) [Restatement
1965, 402A], "Businessof Selling," similarlybegs the
used goods question.It excludes"the occasionalseller,"
i.e., one who does not sell the productin question"as part
of his business."Thiswouldapply,forexample,to thepersonwho sellshis or herprivateautomobile
to eithera neighboror a usedcardealer.
No jurisdictionholdsone-time"casualsellers"of used
goods to a strictliabilitystandard.Courtsfacedwith that
prospecthavereliedon thatportionof Comment(f) [Restatement 1965, 402A] whichexcludes such parties,though
thiscommentdoesprovidethat"it is notnecessarythatthe
sellerbe engagedsolelyin thebusinessof sellingsuchproducts" [cf. Baileyv. ITTGrinnell1982;Gorathv. Rockwell
International1989]. This commentalso includesa broad
policyrationale,however,whichmightbe readto applyto
one in the businessof sellingusedgoods:
Thebasisfortheruleis theancientone of the specialresponsi-

bilityforthesafetyof thepublicundertaken
byonewhoenters
into the businessof supplyinghumanbeings with products
whichmayendangerthe safetyof theirpersonsandproperty,
and the forcedrelianceuponthatundertakingon the partof
thosewho purchasesuchgoods.

This raises moredifficultquestionsregardingsales of
equipmentpreviously used in the seller's business. A
workersoughtdamagesfromtheBoeingCompanyforinjuriescausedby a usedhydraulicplanerthatBoeinghadsold

This content downloaded from 138.202.1.110 on Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:21:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Used Products

180

Exhibit 1. RationaleUtilizedby VariousJurisdictionsto AssessLiabilityfor Used ProductsSellers
Rationale
SellerKnowledgeActualor Imputed
OccasionalSeller

Resellers'Actions

Dutyto Warn

LegalIssues
Causation

StatutoryPreemption

PublicPolicy
Chainof Distribution

FundamentalArgumentsor Logic

States

Occasionalsellersarenot strictlyliableforpersonalinjuriesrelatedto the
productstheysell becausetheyarenotregardedas productexperts.
who arenotin thebusiness
Occasionalsellersarepeopleor organizations
of routinelysellingproducts.Classicconsumerexamplesinvolvesellinga
to a friend,or variousproductsat
lawnmower
to a neighbor,anautomobile
whetheran organization
is anoccasionalseller
a garagesale.Determining
is sometimesdifficultanddependson thefrequencywithwhichsuchsales
occuras well as therelativerevenuesresultingfromsuchsales.
if theyindicate
Theactionsof theusedproductsellercanbe determinative
thatthe sellerknewor shouldhaveknownaboutthe product'sdangerous
If theproductdefectwas causedby the seller's
propensities.
or repairwork,liabilitywill attach.
reconditioning

Massachusetts,
Michigan,
Minnesota,New Jersey,New
York,Ohio,Texas,
Wisconsin
Washington,

Dutyto warnobligationsarisewhentheusedproductsellerhas
thatmaynotbe
knowledgeaboutthe product'sdangerouscharacteristics
obviousto buyers.If the seller'sknowledgeclearlyexceedsthatof the
buyer,a dutyto warnis morelikelyto exist.

California,Florida,Illinois,
Indiana,Iowa,Wisconsin

whenthe defect
Causationgenerallyfocuseson evidenceregarding
actuallycameintobeing.Thedefensewill arguethatthedefectcould
easilyhaveexistedpriorto the usedproduct'ssellercomingin contact
if the defendanthas not
withthe item.Thisis a compellingargument
modifiedor servicedtheproductbutmerelyresoldit.

Kansas,Louisiana,
Mississippi,SouthCarolina,
Missouri,Oklahoma,
Wisconsin
Pennsylvania,

Certainstateshaveenactedor areconsideringlegislationexemptingused
goodssellersfromstrictliabilityactions.Thelanguagein documents
thesestatutesgeneralincludesmanyof the arguments
supporting
minimumsellerknowledge
thoseregarding
mentionedherein,particularly
aboutproductdefects.

Idaho

chainarguments
Thedistribution
essentiallyholdsthe entirechannel
responsiblefor damagesbecauseit is the channelthatresultsin products
reachingfinalconsumers.Thusliabilitypassesbackup thechannelto the
forthesafetyof the
usedgoodsseller.Thechannelis thereforeresponsible
Thisis the samepolicyargument
productsit placesin the marketplace.
usedto justifystrictliabilityfor sellersof new products.

Arizona,New Jersey,
Oregon,Washington

v. RockfordMachineToolCo.
to his employer[Thompson
Courtof Appealsheldthatthe Re1987].The Washington
statement[1965,402A] appliedandfounda materialissue
of factas to whetherdefendantBoeing,anaircraftmanufacturer,was a dealerin usedproductswhenit soldtheplaner.
a sepIn so finding,thecourtnotedthatBoeingmaintained
aratedepartmentthat handledits used equipmentsales.
Otherrelevantevidenceincludedthe numberof itemssold,
andtheamountof companyresourcesderevenuegenerated,
voted to used equipmentsales [Stiles v. BataviaAtomic
Horseshoes1992].
A similaroutcometranspiredin Galindov. Precision
American[1985].A trialcourtruledin favorof thesellerof
a usedsawmilltrimmerthathadinjuredanemployeeof the
firmpurchasing
the device.The FifthCourtof Appealsreversed this decision and remandedthe case for the trial
courtto determineif the marketingof usedproductswas a
routinepartof the defendant'sbusinessoperations.

Alaska,Arkansas,Georgia,
Kansas,New Hampshire,
New Jersey,SouthDakota,
Wisconsin

In contrast,a New Yorkcourtfound thatGeneralElectric
was no more than an occasional seller when it disposed of
a high-speed grinding mill in a surplus equipment sale
[Sukljianv. Charles Ross & Son Co. 1986}. The court declined to hold GeneralElectricstrictly liable for subsequent
injuries caused by the mill, even though the case involved
more than the single or isolated sale describedin Comment
(f) [Restatement 1965, 402A]. The court also noted that
GeneralElectric had the facilities to repairsuch equipment
but had not done so because it had been unawareof the defect that subsequently injured the plaintiff [cf. Bevard v.
Ajax Manufacturing1979; Santiago v. E.W.Bliss 1985].
As expected, someone in the business of regularlyselling
used products can readily be held to a strict liability standard.The plaintiff in Nelson v. Nelson Hardware [1991] recovered from the retailerwho had sold him a used firearm
that turnedout to be defective. The retailerbought and sold
both new and used guns, though he did not stock new mod-
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els of the weaponin question.The WisconsinSupreme
Courtfoundthe retailerto be a "seller" for purposesof
[1965][cf. Ferragamov Massa402A of the Restatement
chusetts Bay TransportationAuthority 1985].

Resellers'ActionsRationale
Whenthe sellerhasrebuiltor reconditioned
productsthatit
thensells,strictliabilitygenerallyapplies.A similarconsensus exists when the seller's defective repairwork has
causedinjuries[Shapo1990]. The resultsare less certain
when the seller reconditionsproductsutilizingpartspurchasedfroma thirdparty.
In Realmutov. StraubMotors [1974], the New Jersey Su-

premeCourtheld thata used cardealerwas strictlyliable
for injuriesfromdefectivework,repairs,or replacements
madeon a vehiclebeforeresellingit. Othercourtshaveeitherfollowedthis approachor cited it approvinglyin relateddecisions[cf. Shapo1990,18.13-18.16; Crandell

v. Larkinand Jones Appliance 1983; KodiakElectricAssociation v. Delaval Turbine1984].

The buyerplaintiffhas even strongerargumentswhen
the selleris evasiveor dishonestaboutthe natureof the repair work. In Petrus Chrysler-Plymouthv. Davis [1984],

the defendant'semployeesaid thatan automobile'swiring
had been repairedwhen,in fact, nothinghad been done.
The consumerrecoveredwhenthe defectivepartcauseda
fire.
Alternatively,resellerrepairactivitydoes not automatically resultin the plaintiff'srecovery.In Barrisv. Eddy's
Toyotaof Wichita[1988],the left rearaxleof theplaintiff's
vehicle was repairedby the defendant.When the axle
failed,the plaintiffsuedon the basis of strictliabilityand
breachof warranty.The federaldistrictcourtof Kansas
grantedthe defendant'ssummarymotion6with respectto
the strictliabilityclaim,statingthatthe plaintiffconsumer
hadfailedto provideany evidencethatthe defendanthad
knownthatthe repairpartsmightbe defective[cf. Bennett
v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile 1991; Brigham v.

HudsonMotors1978].In addition,otherevidenceindicated
thatthe autohadbeenoperatedbeyondits designlimits.
An analogousoutcomeoccurredin Rolphv. EGICompanies [1991].The userof a bendingroll machinesuedboth
the machine'smanufacturer
andthe firmthatreconditioned
themachineat therequestof theuser'semployer.TheWisconsinSupremeCourtruledthatthe key elementwas that
didnotsell themachinebutmerelyreconthe reconditioner
ditioned it. Had the machine been resold, i.e., "placed into
the stream of commerce," by the reconditioner, the firm
would probablyhave been held strictly liable.

Dutyto WarnRationale
Resellers who do not repairor maintainused products
could, nevertheless,have a duty to warnbuyers aboutproduct-relateddangers or problems. In Sell v. Bertsch [1984]
the used machineryseller was found to have no duty to repair a 40-year-oldrolling machinethatsubsequentlyinjured
a buyer's employee. But the defendant was denied summaryjudgment when the court ruled that the reseller's possible duty to warn the buyer about the dangerousoperating
featuresof the used machine was a jury question.The same
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outcomewas reachedwith respectto a usedprintingpress
in Josephs v. Harris Corp. [1982].

The plaintiffwas unableto recoverin Burrowsv. Follett
andLeach[1983],eventhougha guardwas missingfroma
rotatingshafton a usedcornpickerat the timeof purchase.
The plaintiffbuyerhad apparentlynoticedthatthe guard
was missing, making the danger obvious to him and
therebyobviatingthe need for the defendantto warnhim
aboutthe missingguard.The sellerdid not ordinarilypurchase used equipmentfor resale,but did occasionallyaccept suchmachineryin tradefor new equipment.
In Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal [1971] the plaintiff

was injuredwhile tryingto cut open steel drumswith an
acetylenetorch.Amongotherclaims,the plaintiffargued
thatthe defendantwho soldhimtheuseddrumshada duty
to warnof the dangersinvolvedin workingaroundthese
used containers.The MississippiSupremeCourtrejected
thiscontention,notingthattheplaintiffhadconsiderable
experienceworkingwiththis typeof drum.In fact,the plaintiff had specifiedthis particular
typeof drumwhenplacing
the orderwiththedefendantscrapmetaldealer[cf.Buckbee
v. RockwoodInsurance 1989].

Industrycustomwithregardto usedgoodscan also lead
to a verdictin favorof defendant
usedgoodssellers.InMayberryv. AkronRubberMachinery[1979], the defendantsup-

withseveralobsoletepartsto be usedin aspliedMayberry
a
rubber
sembling
mixingmill. Sincethe buyerwas an exwith
to
pert
regard thesepartsandhad purchasedsimilar
partselsewhere,the sellerhadno dutyto warnaboutpossiit wascustomary
ble dangers.Apparently
forbuyersandsellers of suchcomponentsto acquirethemon an "as is" basis
withoutinspectionsor warnings[cf. Ikerdv. Lapworth
1970; Williamsv. Nuckolls 1982; Shirey v. U.S. 1984].

Legal Issues

Causation(Timingof Defect)Rationale
A majorityof the courtsconsideringstrictliabilityfor used
goods sellershave adoptedthe positionof the IllinoisSupreme Courtas set forthin Peterson v. LouBachrodt Chev-

roletCo. [1975].7Absentallegations
thatdefectsin thebraking systemexistedin a used car whenit left the dealeror
thatthe dealerhadcreatedthedefects,the courtdeclinedto
subject the defendantused car dealerto strict liability.
Doing so, the majoritydeclared,wouldmakethe dealeran
insureragainstdefectsthathad come into existenceafter
the product had left the original chain of distribution and
come under control of one or more consumers.
In Tauber-AronsAuctioneersv. Superior Court [1980], a
Californiaappellatecourtlikewise declined to apply strictliability to used goods sales where no proof existed that the
defendant seller had created the defect that caused plaintiff's injuries.A workerhad sued the seller of a used planer
that caused his injuries. The court noted that the plaintiff
had not presented any other bases, such as salespersons'
statementsor promotionalbrochures,that would have supportedjustifiable expectationsregardingthe safety, quality,
and durability of the planer. Furthermore, the court regardeda used goods dealer as outside the "enterprise"that
producesand distributesthe new productto consumers.Con-
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besequently,therewasno continuingbusinessrelationship
dealerandthemanufactweentheordinaryusedmachinery
turerthatwouldhave allowedthe formerto makeadjustments for the costs of protecting itself against strict
liability.
Similarly, in LaRosa v. Superior Court [1981], another

Californiacourtrejectedstrict liability when defendant
sellerof a usedpunchpressshowedthatit didnotcausethe
productdefect in questionand had expresslydisclaimed
forits condition.Thecourtalso observed
anyresponsibility
thatused goods buyers"consciously"tradedoff quality
for lowerprice.Courtsin manyotherstateshave also declined to impose strictliabilityfor latentproductdefects
thattheusedgoodsdealerneithercausednorcouldhavediscoveredby reasonableandcustomaryinspection[cf. Keith
v. Russell T Bundy & Associates 1986; Grimes v. Axtell
Ford Lincoln-Mercury1987].

In orderto assessproperlytheissuesof timingof thedefect, the SupremeCourtof Wisconsinreverseda circuit
court'ssummary
judgmentin favorof a defendantautomobile lessorin Kempv. Miller1990.Heretheplaintiffwasinjuredby an allegedlydefectiverentedautomobile.Thecircuit courtdeterminedthatthe lessorwas not strictlyliable
norsellerof automobecauseit was neithera manufacturer
there
insufficient
evidenceto deterwas
biles; moreover,
mine when the defect occurred.The supremecourtdisagreedwithbothof theseconclusionsandordereda trialto
determinewhenthe defectarose.

StatutoryPreemptionRationale
to limitstrictliOccasionallystatuteshavebeeninterpreted
For
used
actions
for
ability
products. example,theIdaholegislaturehas enacteda statutethatexcludes "commercial
seller of used products"from the definitionof product
seller [Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank 1990]. Sev-

eral other states are also consideringsuch exclusionary
language.

Public Policy-Chain of DistributionRationale
The leadingcase for invokingstrictliabilityin usedgoods
is the New Jerseycase Turnerv. International
transactions
HarvesterCo. [1975].Plaintiffs decedenthadpurchaseda
usedtruckfromdefendanttruckdealership.Decedenthad
raisedthe cab to workon the engineand,while doing so,
the cab fell andkilled him. In addressingthe questionof
strict liability for defendant seller of the used truck, the
court discussed policy considerations.It identified them as
cost spreading and buyers' justifiable expectations of
safety, quality, and durability.The latterwould be lower for
used goods and might vary accordingto the knowledge or
sophisticationof the particularbuyer. This raised a factual
issue under the "unreasonably dangerous" provision of
402A of the Restatement [1965]. In any event, the court
said, a seller should bear responsibilityfor "safety defects,
whether known or unknown at the time of sale, present
while the machine was underhis control." Thus, the Turner
decision used an enterpriseliability theory (i.e., distribution
channel as an overall business enterprise) to hold used
goods sellers strictly liable for defects, including latent

ones, thatexistedwhenthe productwas underthe seller's
control.8
Arizonatookthe sameapproachin Jordanv. Sunnyslope
Appliance[1983],a case thatinvolveda usedpropanefuel
tankwith a defectiveshut-offvalve thatcausedan explosion thatdestroyedplaintiff'shouse.The opinionfollowed
thatusedprodTurner,
notingwithapprovaltheobservation
ucts buyersstill expectsafetywhenpurchasinga serviceable productas opposedto junkparts.It furtheragreedwith
the enterprise
liabilitytheoryas thebasisforinvokingstrict
liabilityandexplicitlystatedthata sellerneednotbe in the
to be regardedas partof the
"initialchain"of distribution
Thecourtalso statedthatusedgoodssellersas a
enterprise.
class couldshiftlosses, distributecosts, andinsureagainst
risks.9 [See also Thompsonv. RockfordMachine Tool Co.

1987.]

Applying Strict Liability to Used
Products Transactions
Legal/PolicyQuestions
strictliabilityfor used
The legal controversies
surrounding
goods marketerslargelyinvolvethe applicabilityof enterpriseliabilitytheory.Manycourtsdeclineto includeused
goods as partof the "enterprise,"which, for new goods
includessuppliersof componentparts,manutransactions,
facturers,wholesalers,retailers,and otherintermediaries.
andmarketing
systemas a sinTreatingtheentireproduction
forliabilitypurposesleadsto the spreadingof
gle enterprise
risks and costs, providingstrongincentives for product
safety,andmaximizingconsumerprotection.Havingbeen
hurtby a new product,the consumersues the seller,some
formof retailer,whoin turnbringsothermembersof thedisintothe distributionnetwork,includingthe manufacturer,
pute. The court,by applyingthe Restatement[1965] and
commonlaw precedent,thendetermineswho shouldbear
the injuredconsumer.By denying
burdenof compensating
used goods buyersaccess to the marketing"enterprise,"
some courtshaveeffectivelyrequiredsuchbuyersto carry
fortheirinjuries,regardlessof the manner
the responsibility
in whichthe productbecamedefective.
of newprodTheextentto whichmanufacturers/marketers
ucts also participatein used goods channelsprovidesanotherview of enterpriseliabilitytheory.Froma "firstimone mightconcludethatmanufacturpression"standpoint,
shouldnot
ers thatarenot activein usedgoodsdistribution
be found liable under strict liability. Their involvement
could be described as passive, so why should they be liable? This logic is not, however, supportedby contemporary
views of strict liability for new goods. All channel members, including wholesalers [Bittler v. Whiteand Company
1990], brokers [Oscar Mayer v. Mincing Trading 1990],
and assemblers[Yostv. Fuscaldo 1991], can be held strictly
liable for faulty products.Therefore,mere inactivity should
not insulate manufacturers of used goods from strict
liability.
Even the Tillman court, which exempted used product
sales from strict liability, conceded that under an enterprise
analysis, strict liability would "logically follow" [Tillman
v. Vance Equipment Co. 1979]. That court ultimately re-

This content downloaded from 138.202.1.110 on Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:21:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Journalof PublicPolicy & Marketing
jected the enterpriseapproach.Instead,it statedthatwhateveradvantages
theapplication
of strictliabilitymightoffer
in termsof meetingconsumers'
andreproductexpectations
ducingrisksthroughincentivesforbetterproductswereoffsetby a desireto holdthestrictliabilitydoctrinewithinmanageablebounds[Tillman1979].The opinionsuggeststhat
strictliabilitywouldchangethe verynatureof usedgoods
markets,presumably
by pricingthe moredangerousitems
out of the market.
The extensionof strictliabilityto used goods transactions probablywouldraiseprices,as the enterprisetheory
predicts.If used goods dealersarerequiredto issue warningsthattakeintoaccounttheage,appearance,
price,andexpecteddurabilityof its wares,pricesof theseproductsmust
increaseto covertheseactivities.The sameforcesyield the
sameresultin new productmarkets,however.Wemustdecide, as a matterof publicpolicy,if it makessenseto trade
off productsafetyfor somewhatlowerpricesin one market
Wemustde(usedgoods)andnottheother(newproducts).
termineif buyersof usedproductshavelowerexpectations
regardingsafetythanbuyersof new products.Are buyers
usedgoodsandbeartheinwillingto purchaselower-priced
creasedrisksassociatedwiththe abolitionof strictliability
in thesemarkets?Perhapssome consumerswill be able to
acquirecertainproductsonly if they can buy used goods
withouttheprotectionof strictliability.As a societyarewe
willing to allow these buyersto makethis choice? Ultimately,the questionbecomesone of protectingconsumers
andtheirjustifiableexpectations
of safeproducts:
Is thisobjective equallycompellingfor both new and used goods
transactions?
Liabilityfor latentdefectsin used goods raisesanother
troublesome
question.California,for example,has rejected
strictliabilitywhenthe sellerof a usedpunchpresshadthe
facilitiesto repairit beforethe sale,butdidnotdo so [Wilkinsonv. Hicks1982;cf. Meyeringv. GeneralMotorsCorporation 1990]. Yet Californiaholds all sellers of new
goods to strictliability standardsfor such defects, as do
mostjurisdictions
v. FordMotorCo. 1964;Re[Vandermark
statement1965,402A; FrumerandFriedman1988,ch. 6].
Thisextendseven to thoseintermediaries
thatareexpected
to pass productsalongto the next firmin the distribution
channelwithoutinspection.It wouldseemthatthesameunderlyingpolicyobjectivesthattheenterprise
liabilitytheory
promotesin these and othernew productsales ought to
applyas well to usedgoodstransactions.
Theenterpriseargumentfor strictliabilityis furtherbolsteredby lookingat whatconstitutesthe differencein legal
standingbetweenthe originaland subsequentownersof a
product-a simpleresaleof the item.Theproducthas still
beenintroduced
into the channelby the manufacturer,
who
shouldbearthe responsibility
for producingandmarketing
safe products,regardlessof who happensto own them.
Strictliabilityprovidesan avenuefor usersto reachsuch
manufacturers/marketers.
theusedproductchannelorenterprise
is difAlternatively,
ferentfromnew productchannelsin a simplebut significantway:thepresenceof theusedproductseller.Theinclusion of this entitywithinthe channelreducesthe certainty
that a productdefect occurredduringmanufacturing
be-
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causethe used goods sellerhad the opportunityto handle
the product,perhapseven damagingit. Perhapsthe used
productselleroverusedthe item,therebymakingit unsafe
for subsequentuse. Holdinga manufacturer
strictlyliable
whenan intermediate
ownerused the productover an extendedperiodof timeessentiallymakesthemanufacturer
responsibleto laterbuyersfor the actionsof earlierbuyersanuntenablepositionforthemanufacturer.
Thus,enterprise
liabilitymayplacetoo greata burdenon channelmembers
handlingusedproducts.
Thoughcourtsoccasionallyhold lessorsof used goods
strictlyliableunderenterpriseliabilityarguments[cf. Cintrone v. Hertz TruckLeasing 1965; Ausness 1987], rent-to-

own firms(RTO)haveyet to be testedwith strictliability
claims. RTOcompaniesdiffer from traditionalleasing
firmsin thatthe lattertypicallyprovideonly financialservices and usually do not take physicalpossessionof the
goodstheylease.RTOs,however,engagein hybridtransactionsbecausetheircustomerscanoptoutof rentalcontracts
or can applyrentalfees towardeventualproductownership
[Nehf1991].If an RTOspecializesin certainproductlines,
it presumablybecomesexpertwith regardto these products, most likely repairingthemwhen necessary.Such a
companytherebypossessesknowledgeequivalentto thatof
a routinesellerof theseproducts.ToabsolveRTOsof strict
liabilitysimplybecausethey arelegallyorganizedas leasing companiesprovidessellers a tantalizingloophole in
productliabilitylaw.
The most defensibledevelopmentregardingliabilityof
usedgoods sellersis the shieldingof one-timesellersfrom
strict liability. To expect someone selling a used lawnmowerata garagesaleto guarantee
its safetyis probably
unreasonable-sucha sellershouldnotbe subjectto strictliability. However,the courtsneedto developa moreclearcutdefinitionof "occasional"selleranda decisionrulefor
weightingthe expertiseof suchsellers.
Marketing/Policy Questions
Somefundamental
andpolicy-related
marketingquestions
needto be investigated.First,buyerexpectations,for both
consumerandindustrialsegments,regardingused product
for variousprodsafetyexpectationsneedto be determined
uct markets.It is difficultto imaginethata rationalused
productbuyerwouldexpectan unsafeproduct,thoughhe
or she mightanticipateless durabilityor poorerfunctional

performancethan with a new one [Turnerv. International
Harvester Co. 1975]. But what kinds of trade-offsare buyers actuallywilling to make amongsafety, durability,performance, and price? Ratherthan simply assertingopinions on
this question, courts should consider properlygatheredand
analyzed data bearing on the issue.
The used vehicle market might be a useful one within
which to make these assessments. Thousands of claims
have been filed in the United States for used vehicle-related
injuries.Though most of these disputes involve warrantyor
negligence actions, the interrelatedness of safety, performance, and price surface routinely. Comparisonscould be
made between judicial assumptions regardingthese tradeoffs and the implicit and explicit assumptionsmade by used
vehicle buyers. Used cars are often sold "as is" without
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of quality;however,usedcardealanysellerrepresentations
ers cannotsimplydisclaimtheirtortliabilityor obligations
regardingimpliedwarrantiesof fitness.Therefore,an "as
is" seller must still inspect the vehicle and place it in
reasonableworking condition [Korpela1991; Soehnel
1991].
couldproveto be quiteuseresearchperspectives
Current
ful here.Bloom[1989],forexample,proposesa seven-step
analysisto determinethe appropriate
policy stanceregardavailableto consumersin productmarkets.
ing information
Amongthese factorsare the harmsufferedby consumers
cues (internal
andthe availabilityandtypeof informational
andexternal)in the market.Usedandnewproductmarkets
couldbe examinedutilizinga framework
comprisingthese
factors.To the extentthatno significantdifferencescan be
derivedwhen comparingused and new productmarkets,
one could argue that the legal system should make no
distinctions.
Fromthe used goods buyer'sperspective,Bayus[1991]
foundthatbuyerswho replacenew automobiles"early"
areconcernedaboutstylingandimage,whereas"late"replacementbuyersaremoreconcernedaboutcost. Perhaps
the same attributesare of relatively similarimportance
when comparingdifferentpurchasersof used goods that
varyin age.Thatis, thosewhobuyextremelyoldusedproducts may have no expectationsregardingsafety;instead,
theyconsidercost andsomeminimallevel of performance.
As a matterof publicpolicy,shouldthesepeoplebe permitted to forgoproductsafetywithoutlegalrecourse?
Relatedly,MowenandMowen[1991,p. 57] provideinstructivepropositions.
Theyhypothesizethatpeoplehavea
coursesof actionwithimmediate
to
choose
strongtendency
but
outcomes
delayed negative consequences.
positive
Usedgoodsandtheirassociatedsafetylevelsmayillustrate
just sucha situation.Consumerscan chooseusedproducts
over new goods becauseof favorablepriceconsiderations,
discountingthegreaterpotentialdangersof used
incorrectly
items in the future.If these kinds of choices are being
made,strictliabilitycouldbe properlyapplied,encouraging
sellers to improveproductsafety to protectbuyerswho
makeriskydecisions.This suggestionassumes,of course,
thatsocietyshouldprotectthesebuyersfromthemselves.Alternatively,if thesebuyerscannotbe forcedto understand
the risks involved, perhaps they should bear the
consequences.
Simplywarningprospectiveused goods buyers,regardless of thelegaladequacyof suchwarnings,maybe insufficient. Tanner,Hunt,and Eppright[1991, p. 43] conclude
thatcommunicatedthreatsmay not actuallybe perceived
by certainaudiencesas beingsevere.Buyerswithmaladapconsumerswithpriorsafe
tive copingbehaviors,particular
experienceswith used goods, may assuagetheirfearsby
thinking,"It won'thappento me." Suchthinkingprovides
psychologicalrelief but does nothingto removepotential
dangers.These resultsare consistentwith the findingsof
MowenandMowen[1991]andmayindicatethat,for some
people,mostwarningswill simplybe ineffective.
The criticalnatureof warningsandotherformsof inforof pricingused
mationis also relevantfromthe standpoint
goods.TellisandGaeth[1990]reportthatincreasedlevels

of information
leadto "better"choicedecisionsin termsof
new productvalue(price/quality).
Marketers
needto determineif thissamerelationship
holdsforusedproductsandif
thecostof information
provisioncanbe passedalongto consumers.Moreimportantlyfromthe standpointof product
safety,areconsumerswillingto choosehigh-valuealternatives thatarebothlow priceandlow quality/safetyif they
have adequateinformation?
This is anotherline of reasonthat
used
ing suggesting
productsbuyersmaybe inclinedtowardunsafechoices.
If usedgoodssellersmustmeeta strictliabilitystandard,
theymaybe restrictedin termsof pricingoptions.Consumers maybe unwillingto bearthecosts of strictliabilityand
associatedinsurancepremiums.If this is the case, used
goods marketsmay well disappearfor some products,at
least in the UnitedStates.The long-termoutcomemay be
that used productswill be increasinglyexportedto lessdevelopedcountriesor nationswith less stringentliability
environments.
The literatureon economicsof informationprovidesan
overviewperspectiveon safety-related
information.
Economistsandothershaveexaminedchoicedecisionsundera vaquality,
rietyof conditionswithrespectto risk,information
information
availability,
bargaining
power,insurancecoverage, etc. [cf. Mazis et al. 1981; Schwartz 1988; Smith
1990].It wouldbe usefulto knowif the assumptionsmade
and conclusions reached in new product markets are
equallyrelevantfor usedgoods.

Conclusion
On balance, extending strict liability to sellers of used
goodswouldservemanyof thepublicpolicygoalsthatthe
doctrinefostersfor new producttransactions.One difference, a criticalone thatneeds to be investigatedempirically, is the level of consumerreliance on the apparent
safety of used goods. Do consumersbelieve that used
goods areas safe as new products,or do theyequatelower
usedgoodspriceswitha lesserdegreeof safety?And,if the
shouldsocietyperlatterquestionis answeredaffirmatively,
mit the safety-pricetrade-off?
Enterpriseliabilitycan also be appliedto used products
channels,butthe situationis complicated
by thepotentialinterveningand unknownactions of priorowners of used
goods.Holdingusedgoodssellersstrictlyliableessentially
makesthemresponsiblefor the consequencesof actionsof
persons (priorproductowners) over whom they have absolutely no control. Such an outcome creates a legal problem
in that it violates the causationrequirementof the strict liability doctrine.However, failureto inspect used productsor
warn buyers about dangersknown to the seller seems to be
reasonablegroundsfor strict liability.
Therefore,commercial organizationsthat regularly market used products should be held strictly liable. The word
"regularly" brings such sellers within the conventional
used goods enterpriseand the failure to inspect or warn can
be linked causally with the consumer's injury. Occasional
sellers, those not in the business of routinely selling used
goods, should not be held strictly liable because they are
not a partof the marketingenterprisethat redistributesused
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products.Suchsellersarealsounlikelyto be expertwithregardto the qualityof the itemstheyareselling.

Notes
1. Restatements
arecompilationsor summaries
by the American
LawInstituteof common(case)law,organizedby subjectmatRestatements
arenotbindingon
ter,e.g., torts,trusts,contracts.
a court,buttheydo reflectthereasoningof important
jurisdictionsandthethinkingfoundin particularly
well-crafted
judicial
opinions.
2. Thisanalysisexaminesstrictliabilityonlyforphysicalinjuries.
Strictliabilityforeconomicharmis notcoveredin thisreview,
norareproductssold as "junk"or "scrap."
3. Privityof contract,describedin theclassicEnglishcaseof Winv. Wright[1842],permitted
aninjuredpersona tortreterbottom
coveryonly fromthepartythathadsoldhimor hertheinjurycausingproduct.A tortactionis a legal actionfor a breachof
dutythatdoes not comefroma contract,butis imputedby the
law. For example,the tortof negligencealleges a breachof
dutyof reasonablecarethatcommonlaw holdspeopleowe to
one another.
4. The relevant portion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

[1965]is 402A (SpecialLiabilityof Sellerof ProductforPhysical Harmto Useror Consumer):
(1) Onewho sells anyproductin a defectiveconditionunreasonablydangerousto the useror consumeror to his propertyis subjectto liabilityforphysicalharmtherebycaused
to theultimateuseror consumer,or to his property,if
(a) the selleris engagedin the businessof sellingsucha
product,and
(b) it is expectedto anddoes reachthe useror consumer
withoutsubstantial
changein theconditionin whichit
is sold.
(2) Therulestatedin Subsection(1) appliesalthough
(a) the sellerhasexercisedall possiblecarein thepreparationandsalesof his product,and
(b) the useror consumerhas notboughtthe productfrom
or enteredintoanycontractual
relationwiththe seller.
5. Virginiahas expressly not adoptedstrict productliability
[Sensenbrennerv. Rust, Orling & Neal 1988]. North Carolina

hasalsorefusedto imposestrictliabilityon defendants
in product liabilitylitigation.This informationis basedon a 5/3/92
searchof the Lexis [1992] legal and periodicalelectronic
libraries.
6. A judgmentby the court,priorto a juryverdict,thatan issue
canbe decidedas a matterof lawgiventhefactsof thecase.Eitherplaintiffor defendantcanmovefor summary
judgment.
7. Ourreviewof strictliabilityforsellersof usedproductsyielded
casesfrom29 states.A recentreviewby Korpela[1991]identified 28 statesthathaveheardstrictliabilityallegationsrelated
to usedproducts.
8. Theconceptof enterprise
liabilitywasfirstwidelydiscussedin
the marketingliteraturein commentaries
on the DES marketsharelitigation [cf. Boedeckerand Morgan1986; Sheffet
was the vari1983].In thesecases the defendant"enterprise"
ous competitorsmarketingDES duringcertaintime periods.
Eachof thesefirmswasheldliableforthecollectiveactsof the
(andeachtriedto exonerateitselfby blamingothers)
enterprise
becausethefungiblenatureof DESmadeit impossibleforplaintiffs to identifyany one defendant'sDES as the harmfulsubstance.Thus,the DES andrelatedcasesexaminedcompetition
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levelwithincompeting,
simamongfirmsatthesamehorizontal
ilarchannelsandformedtheenterprise
amongthesefirms.
In the presentdiscussionthe "enterprise"is the traditional
verticalchannelof distribution.
In a productliabilityactioninvolvinga usedproduct,theplaintifftypicallysuesall members
of thechannelorenterprise
involvedin marketing
theusedproduct.If thecourtcannotdeterminewhichchannelmember'sactionsled to theproductcausingtheplaintiffs injuries,thechannel as an enterprise
canbe heldliable.Channelmembersmust
thensortoutamongthemselves
howto sharetheburdenof compensatingthe plaintiff.See Priest[1985]for detailedviews of
verticalandhorizontalenterprise
liability.
9. Arizonareassertedits acceptanceof enterprise
liabilityin Torres v. Goodyear Tire& Rubber[1990] when a trademarklicen-

sor (supplierof allegedlyfaultyautomobiletire)was included
in a strictliabilityaction.
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